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Three Questions About the Social Life of Values
Harry Walker
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
ABSTRACT
This afterword to the Qualifying Sociality through Values special
issue reflects on the challenge, aptly considered by each
contributor, to revamp and rejuvenate the sociality concept in
light of the ethical turn. It poses three questions. Firstly, just how
important are values for sociality? That is, to what extent is social
action really conceived and executed through values? Secondly,
how does sociality itself figure as a value, and how should we
accommodate values that are not obviously prosocial such as
separation and withdrawal? Thirdly, what is the relationship
between competing values – when and how (if at all) do values
genuinely conflict rather than complement or reinforce one
other, and how do people then choose between them? These
questions are crucial, I suggest, if we are to advance our
understanding of how people embark on the shared project of





Introduction: Unpacking Vernacular Socialities Through Values
The concept of sociality continues to evolve in intriguing new directions. One virtue of this
collection is that it directs our attention to why the concept remains relevant and how it can
be revamped in the wake of both the ethical and ontological turns through an analytical
focus on values, opening up new theoretical vistas and lines of enquiry along the way.
This is, to be sure, an ambitious aim: despite (or perhaps because of) their considerable
analytical appeal, both concepts – sociality and values – have proved difficult to pin
down, with each responsible for a proliferation of sometimes competing definitions. Explor-
ing their relationship, their mutual entwinement, might seem an unwieldy undertaking, to
say the least. Yet it is also a crucially important one. As the papers gathered heremake clear,
both concepts go to the heart of the question of how people in vastly different circumstances
not only seek to create good andmeaningful lives, as joint projects that demand the company
of others, but how they justify to others the choices they make in doing so.
The collection thus helpfully takes up and rethinks the concept of sociality – as devel-
oped especially in contributions by Strathern (1990), Ingold (1997), and Long and Moore
(2013) among others – in ways that take account of some important recent developments
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in the discipline. One such development is the turn towards materiality, and concomitant
recognition of the ways in which ostensibly ‘immaterial’ values or ideas are typically
deeply embedded in concrete material configurations and practices. This is drawn out
particularly clearly in the contributions by Lounela (2021) and Gibson (2021), both of
whom show how distinct worlds of value correspond to, and arise within, distinct
configurations of the natural and man-made environment and the forms of social life
these enable; it also informs Herrmans’s (2021) account, which highlights how ritual
action in particular can serve as a key domain for the materialisation of value.
Very much related to this is the way the ontological turn has so compellingly refocused
attention on the diverse ways in which non-humans are implicated within human lives
and ideational worlds, while calling into question the modernist idea of the ‘social’ as a
category founded in, and intelligible through, an opposition to the ‘natural’. Several
papers here show how understandings of human sociality may be deepened or thrown
into relief when we take relationships with non-humans, or ‘more-than-human sociality’,
into account. This comes through nicely in Herrmans’ account of the values of sharing
and reciprocity as revealed through Luangans’ relations with spirits, as well as Remme’s
(2021) account of how unstable relations with spirits and ancestors illuminate some of
the dangers that pervade human sociality also, and which arise from an analogous
need to strike a cautious balance between connection and distance.
Though notmade explicit in any of the contributions, there are important ways in which
they speak to a thriving interdisciplinary literature around human cooperation. A number
of prominent accounts have sought to tie the emergence of cooperation closely to morality
and, especially, fairness, which are posited as having evolved precisely with that function
(see inter alia Tomasello and Vaish 2013; Henrich and Henrich 2007; Baumard and
Sperber 2013; Stafford, Judd, and Bell 2018; Gellner et al. 2020). To take one recent
example, Curry, Mullins, and Whitehouse (2019) seek to demonstrate systematically that
across a very wide range of cultural contexts, ‘specific forms of cooperative behaviour
(helping kin, helping your group, reciprocating, being brave, deferring to superiors, dividing
disputed resources, and respecting prior possession) will be considered morally good wher-
ever they arise’ (48). Moreover, ‘each type of cooperation explains a corresponding type of
morality: (1) family values, (2) group loyalty, (3) reciprocity, (4) bravery, (5) respect, (6) fair-
ness, and (7) property rights’ (2019, 48). There is clearly much common ground here, and a
potentially fruitful dialogue to be had. That said, however, the concept of cooperation as it
figures in this literature starts, as I read it, from almost opposite premises to the concept of
sociality as taken up in this volume; specifically, it postulates cooperation as a problem to be
overcome, andmorality as a key tool in the solution, which in turn relies on a conception of
autonomous, fully formed individuals who then enter into relation. The concept of sociality,
meanwhile, purports to start from the premise that people are formed through their
relations with others, and in this way adds an important generative quality to social relation-
ships, one that appears to be lacking inmost theories of cooperation.Moreover, as several of
the papers gathered here show, cooperative, prosocial behaviour is not always or exclusively
positively valued – an important topic I return to below.
While an ethnographic diversity in terms of societal scale and complexity is a key strength
of this collection, with contexts ranging fromDanish classrooms to Dayak villages, there is a
discernible Southeast Asian inflection, with three of the five papers based on fieldwork in
Indonesia and one from the Philippines. These are arguably contexts in which
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anthropological discussions of such ‘classic’ values as equality and hierarchy, or personal
autonomy, have been relatively salient. Most contributors, meanwhile, could be situated
within a broadlyNordic social milieu that is known (whether fairly or otherwise) for its inte-
grative values of egalitarianism and individualism (see also Anderson (2021) in this volume).
This lends a helpful coherence to the analyses, despite the diversity of approaches, while also
helping to contextualise some of the key themes and arguments. For example, the collection
effectively takes on board some key insights from recent work onmorality and ethics includ-
ing, especially, an emphasis on the moral and ethical character of much of everyday life: the
idea, as Laidlaw (2014, 3) put it, that ethical considerations pervade human sociality quite
simplybecausepeople are evaluative. It is interesting that relatively littleof themost influential
recentwork in the anthropology of ethics seems to have emerged out offieldwork in the kinds
of contextswearemostlydealingwithhere–whichare, on theotherhand, preciselywhere the
concept of sociality has had greatest purchase. At the same time, the latter arguably already
had something like a concept of value built into it, insofar as it stemmed from a recognition
that it was somethingmore than social structures and patterned obligations that weremotiv-
atingpeople to act in recognisableways; that therewasadistinctivepattern to theflowof social
life itself that had to dowith the kind of life they held dear and the kind of person theywanted
to be. In other words, the usefulness of the concept of sociality has partly stemmed, I would
suggest, from a recognition that it is actually values like autonomy that give certain societies
their distinctive flavour or ethos, and enable us to recognise something distinctive that guides
peoples’ actions and in some important sense unites them in a common project, even in the
absence of rigid social structures or hierarchies or coercive authority.
While the authors here have thus each developed their own way of theorising the
concept of sociality and its relationship to values, and have identified as salient a range
of different themes, there is clearly a great deal of common ground. It is especially for-
tunate, given the potential for abstraction inherent in the theme itself, that the analyses
rarely stray far from the grounded and robust ethnographic data on which they are based;
among other things, this makes it possible to probe the pieces further and potentially
along lines not explicitly developed by their authors. I propose, then, in what follows,
to reflect on three questions which, I would like to suggest, the articles gathered here col-
lectively pose, and help us to think through. I offer these as lines of enquiry and tools for
thought, and only tentatively point to possible answers. I begin by asking after the impor-
tance of values for sociality: that is, to what extent is social action really conceived and
executed through values? Secondly, how does sociality itself figure as a value – and
how should we accommodate values that are not obviously prosocial, such as separation,
withdrawal, or conflict? Thirdly, what is the relationship between competing values –
when and how, if at all, do values genuinely conflict, rather than complementing or rein-
forcing one other, and how do people then choose between them? All three questions are
crucially important for an adequate account of the myriad ways in which people craft
shared lives that are meaningful and worthwhile.
Question 1. Just How Pervasive Are Values in Human (and More-than-
Human) Sociality?
Just how important, really, are values? What is the extent of the role they play in shaping
or giving expression to sociality? Such questions seem especially pertinent against the
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backdrop of an ethical turn in which it is sometimes proposed that people tend to be gen-
uinely concerned with questions of what is right or good in their lives, and are predis-
posed to evaluate the actions of others along just these lines. Some might say, in
retort, that on the contrary, many people appear to engage in little ethical reflection or
deliberation at all, and would rather just get on with it, as it were. In crude terms this
echoes one of the more high-profile debates in the field around the problem of where
to locate the ethical: as imbuing the flow of ‘ordinary’, everyday life (e.g. Lambek 2010;
Das 2012); or as likely to become salient, a matter of conscious reflection, only in
moments of crisis, in the wake of ‘moral breakdown’ (e.g. Zigon 2007). While claims
for the relative salience of the ethical in people’s lives helped to make the case for the
importance of the anthropology of ethics as an emerging sub-discipline, it is arguably
also the case that many of those involved carried out fieldwork in religious settings
where moral concerns are perhaps unusually salient.
On virtually all sides of this debate, it must be noted, there has been a more or less
determined attempt to break with Durkheim’s analysis of the religious and thus moral
foundations of social order, for instance as developed in The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life. According to Laidlaw (2014), Durkheim’s idea of morality was basically
a codified representation of society itself, and conceiving the ‘moral’ as virtually cotermi-
nous with the ‘social’ in that way leaves little room for an account of deliberation or self-
fashioning, or ethical freedom. The question might well be asked, then: does examining
sociality through values imply something like a return to Durkheim – an attempt, at least,
to resuscitate what was most valuable in his approach? The literature on cooperation
mentioned above does seem somewhat to vindicate his suggestion that people’s con-
ceptions of the good are closely tied to, perhaps even typically expressions of, forms of
prosocial behaviour. To paraphrase Yan (2011), there is perhaps only so far we can
move away from Durkheim, and a focus on sociality in light of values appears in some
ways to embed a Durkheimian concern with questions of integration, solidarity, and con-
sensus. Yet if the authors in this volume have for the most part chosen not to examine
explicitly instances of deviance or difference, or peoples’ capacity to articulate and
pursue values that are potentially at odds with the dominant value system – their
ethical freedom – there is also a clear concern to explore instances where people have
come into conflict because of their different values, or – even more interestingly,
perhaps – their differing interpretations of the same value. As Remme makes clear in
his exploration of a brutal murder in this volume, such conflicting interpretations can
lend instability and even high drama to dominant forms of sociality, and could be con-
sidered key to its constitution.
To return, then, to the question about the scope and reach of the moral and ethical
fields in everyday sociality, we might suggest that this is indeed usefully approached
through values. It draws attention to the question of motivation, in the first instance –
or why people act as they do – and it may be useful, in this connection, to recall
Weber’s typology of social action. Weber is of course often invoked as a key ancestor
for theories of value (e.g. Robbins 2018), and it is well worth bearing in mind that he
also developed some of the most influential and incisive writing on the nature of the
social, not least concerning the ways in which symbolic principles more generally can
condition and shape enduring patterns of social order. In Economy and Society, he pro-
posed that social action can be conceptually differentiated into four ideal types which
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more or less correspond to degrees of conscious reflection. Only one of these four (so-
called ‘value-rational’ action, where an action has an inherent value independent of
any outcome) was explicitly formulated in relation to a concept of value; and it was
seen as less rational or ‘logical’ than instrumentally-rational action, the scope of which
he felt was ever growing in the modern world.1
Might the suggestion that people tend to act with values in mind thus be something of
an overstatement? Whatever the theoretical value of Weber’s scheme, however, it is not
methodologically straightforward to determine the degree of deliberation or conscious
reflection at work when observing the action of others. Rich ethnography does
perhaps permit a degree of insight, and at least some papers in this collection make a
case for the prominence of social action motivated by values. Their importance as
drivers of particular forms of sociality is strongly implied in Gibson’s account of the
Indonesian Makassar, where at least some individuals were motivated to pursue social
status, salvation, and national development within the Austronesian, Islamic and
‘modern’ spheres respectively. Anderson shows how children must learn to behave
towards others in ways that express and enact what she terms ‘Danish democratic
values’ – although she also rightly questions whether these values should really be seen
as motivating action, and thus conceptually prior to it. Danish teachers seek to imbue
these values as they teach children which forms of behaviour are acceptable; and their
uptake and internalisation is clear in the latter’s comments that, for instance, everyone’s
efforts in some task are ‘equally good’ – even if their actions do not quite bear that out in
practice. This might be taken as suggesting that values may play a more important role in
interpreting and especially justifying action post-hoc, rather than in motivating it per se.
In the other contexts in which sociality has a less deliberative and intentional aspect,
values appears to be less clearly or consciously articulated, albeit still present in some
way: Remme, for instance, proposes that contrastive values of tradition and autonomy
‘are involved in shaping social actions in various and not always compatible ways’; Herr-
mans identifies the values of modesty and proportionality as underwriting Luangan soci-
ality and its dynamics of quiet restraint; and Lounela proposes that practices of sharing
and working together manifest values of relationality or solidarity, which in turn relate
closely to equality. I did wonder, however, about the extent to which people could
really be said to hold values such as these in mind, when choosing a course of action,
or even when engaging in acts of justification and critique. To pursue the question
further, it would be helpful to hear more about how these values are expressed in the
local vernacular, and how and when – in which contexts, if any – they enter into
discourse.
Question 2. How Does Sociality Itself Figure as a Value?
People everywhere, these papers seem to suggest, operate with an emic concept of soci-
ality that almost inevitably lends itself to forms of evaluation. How and in what ways,
then, is sociality itself valued? And how should we accommodate apparently conflicting
values such as separation, withdrawal or conflict? In the first instance, people do seem
often to make evaluative judgements about particular forms of sociality that are seen
as desirable in a particular context: as in Anderson’s account of Danish classrooms,
where there is a very explicit sense that there is a ‘right’ way of being social and that
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this must be taught (and learned) appropriately. As she puts it, ‘getting a particular social
form right matters to those involved’. Anderson might further be taken as implying that
there is sometimes an aesthetic quality to such value judgements: that particular ways of
interacting are not merely considered correct but in some sense beautiful, or ugly. We are
reminded of Overing and Passes’ (2000, xii) insight that ‘there is an aesthetics to Ama-
zonian ways of action, and styles of everyday relating that are morally – and therefore
aesthetically – not only proper but beautiful and pleasing’. Sociality does seem susceptible
to judgements of value on aesthetic grounds, although questions of taste seem far less
individual and subjective in this context than we are probably used to assuming.
While particular forms of sociality may be compared and valued with respect to one
another, there is also a more general sense in which sociality is valued as a foundational
dimension of the human condition: sociality not as a particular social form, but a state of
existence in a general relational matrix. As we have seen, the concept of sociality is a
useful corrective to more static and bounded alternatives such as ‘society’ or ‘culture’
– and yet it arguably retains the foundation of these concepts in notions such as unity,
cooperation, and integration. This is also, as I have noted, a role played by values,
which express justifiable notions of what is good or desirable in ways that bring
people together. Hence the overlap between the two concepts themselves, and the pre-
vailing sense of sociality as highly valuable in itself. That said, Long and Moore (2013,
7) do make the point that (despite the propensities of certain philosophers) sociality
should not be equated with ‘group living’ or a ‘we-mode’ and is not necessarily all
about commitment and connection. Social ties, they point out, may be dense with aggres-
sion and danger, and ‘even those modalities of engaging with others that cultivate forms
of detachment, or the simulation of non-relations, can be valuably understood as a par-
ticular ethical engagement with the very relations that they suppress’ (Long and Moore
2013, 7). Moreover, as Long puts it in his own analysis of an online gaming community,
‘visions of the good life need not be based on communitarianism and the erasure of
difference and discord’ (Long 2013, 113).
In a similar vein, a number of scholars have in recent years drawn attention to the
value people may place on disengagement from others: Candea et al. (2015, 1), for
instance, have argued that while ‘[e]ngagement has… become a definitive and unques-
tionable social good… in a wide range of settings detachment is still socially, ethically
and politically valued’. Along such lines, Kavedžija (2019) has recently shown how con-
temporary Japanese artists value processes of withdrawal and isolation as an essential
component of their creative process, which demands a careful balance between valued
forms of sociality and moments of inner withdrawal. Social engagement is seen as impor-
tant and beneficial and is clearly highly valued; at the same time, inspiration often came
when people were alone, and thus artists were very conscious of the need to create and
protect a space for artistic work which shielded them from the pressures and distractions
of everyday life.
Many of the papers gathered here similarly examine the value, but also the limits, of
everyday sociality (or at least its figuring as a more generic ‘relationality’), and the value
many people place on withdrawal and independence. Remme, for instance, is clear that
‘too much sociality’ is undesirable for Ifugao villagers in the Philippines, who work hard
to maintain distance where it is required. Lounela similarly writes of the value of discon-
nection from others among the Dayak of Borneo and how that allows for self-
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determination, despite the otherwise high value placed once again on relationality. Soci-
ality is also regarded with ambivalence when it comes to be seen as instrumental, or as
motivated by economic considerations, which is increasingly the case with the rise of
the handel groups; such ambivalence is one reason why people have begun to shy
away from assuming leadership roles. Herrmans, meanwhile, is quite explicit that
while ‘relationality’ has high intrinsic value for the Luangans of Indonesian Borneo, as
the focus of collective ritual and other activities, sociality also has a dark side and can
also be perilous; mistrust always lurks right beneath the surface. Here, too, people are
concerned – and especially when it comes to spirits – to generate closeness and recipro-
city, but only up to a point, and in ways that allow for maintaining difference and dis-
tance. In short, there is a particular way that sociality ‘should’ be represented
discursively – its ideological dimension, if you will – which does not necessarily corre-
spond the way it unfolds on the ground. There is perhaps a useful distinction to be
made here, between the sociality that people actually enact, with its tendencies
towards disengagement and mistrust, and the rosier ideals of harmonious sociality
that tend to figure as a consciously articulated values. Any disjunctions between these
might prove particularly fertile sites for further investigation. This leads to another ques-
tion that few have taken up explicitly but which I find particularly pertinent, concerning
the extent to which values are part of an ideological matrix that legitimises domination or
inequality even as it hides them from view. The value of hereditary rank amongMakassar
speakers in Indonesia, as described by Gibson in this volume, and the corporate and hier-
archical form of sociality it entails, might be a case in point.
Question 3. What Is the Relationship Between Values?
The third and final question I wish to pose here concerns the relationship between those
values constitutive of sociality: when and how, if at all, do these values conflict or contra-
dict one another, rather than complementing or even reinforcing one other, and how, in
such circumstances, do people choose between them? Consider for a moment the con-
tribution by Gibson in this volume, who argues for the coexistence of distinct ‘symbolic
complexes’, zones of action exemplified and materially instantiated in the house, the
mosque, and the school, and which correspond quite closely, I think, to what Weber
referred to as distinct value spheres. On the one hand, Gibson proposes that these sym-
bolic complexes are ‘incommensurable’ and that the values associated with each are effec-
tively in competition, such that individual actors are compelled to choose between them.
On the other hand, he observes that the symbolic capital accumulated in one sphere can
be converted into another: people often try to use their religious knowledge or their
wealth, for instance, to improve their social rank. In the final analysis, it is unclear to
me whether, or in what terms, the average individual experiences genuine conflict.
Might it instead be an artefact of the analysis?
The question recalls the classic debate in moral and political philosophy between
advocates of value pluralism on the one hand and value monism on the other. While
the former claim that the values of a particular society are ultimately irreconcilable
with one another and destined to conflict, the latter claim they are ultimately integrated
in some way, either because they are reducible to some ultimate value such as happiness,
or because the realisation of each value ultimately supports the realisation of all others.
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As Robbins (2013) has noted, anthropologists have naturally gravitated towards value
pluralism, the position first made famous by Isaiah Berlin: Lambek (2008), for instance,
has argued that ethical values, unlike economic values, tend to be incommensurable, and
thus require the exercise of judgement. To be sure, it is not difficult to find instances
where values appear to conflict (liberty and equality being the classic example in the
Western tradition), or where people feel torn between two courses of action, each of
which seems to align with something they hold dear. Robbins himself proposes an
empirical approach to the question: some societies may be pluralist and others monist
when it comes to values, and it is up to us as analysts to figure out which is which.
This is a good approach for an anthropologist, even if philosophically evasive. And yet
I do think it worth highlighting the power of Dworkin’s (2011) argument for value
monism, and its relevance for anthropologists. Unlike some monists, he does not posit
some higher value of utility from which the value of other aims is derived. Instead he
claims that genuine values do not conflict, but are instead mutually supportive: there
is, in short, a fundamental unity to value. To be sure, people often experience what
they take to be a conflict between competing values; but such conflict is more apparent
than real, and based on a misinterpretation of one or more of the values involved. A
better interpretation – which is what we should be striving for – will reveal how the
values may be reconciled, and thus, ultimately, the correct course of action. For
example, in the Western liberal tradition, freedom and equality are often taken to
conflict irreconcilably; the most we can hope for is some kind of acceptable compromise
between them. Dworkin’s position, however, is that a more precise interpretation of
these values can reveal their interdependence. He draws an important distinction here
between values and desiderata, or that which society finds desirable; only values have
‘judgemental force’ and entail that a person who fails to respect a value wrongs
someone. The question might then be expressed as follows: are our interlocutors,
when choosing one course of action over another where an ostensible conflict of
values is involved, actually committing a wrong against someone? Do they feel
remorse? If not, it may well be the case that a better interpretation of those values
will reveal how they in fact reinforce one another.
It is striking how many of the papers here point to a remarkably similar tension
between two distinct values, construed as lying at the heart of the particular forms of soci-
ality described: values variously glossed as autonomy and relationality (Herrmans);
autonomy and tradition (Remme); autonomy and solidarity (Lounela); or ‘being
social’ and ‘being oneself’ (Anderson). The authors mostly take for granted that these
values stand in tension, and that this lends sociality its dynamic and unstable quality.
While I do not necessarily disagree with such an analysis, a strong case could be made
that these values are more compatible with one another than they seem. This is effectively
the conclusion arrived at by Anderson, who writes: ‘Rather than seeing this as antithetical
to “being social”, as liberal ideology might have it, I regard “being oneself” as a perfor-
mative genre on par with and interwoven in the enactment of “being social”’. If we
turn to other places characterised by a similar kind of tension between autonomy and
relatedness, such as native Amazonia, we indeed see that what counts as personal auton-
omy for local people not only emerges out of intense and intimate forms of sociality,
which is so often oriented towards the production of persons; but that sociality itself is
valued only insofar as participants are autonomous (e.g. Walker 2012, 1–5). What
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appears to us as a tension or conflict between values thus ultimately demands a more
careful interpretation, until their mutually supportive qualities become clear.
Consider, for instance, the adoption of ‘new’ values of individualism and corporate
sociality introduced by the new canal groups in Kalimantan – the case discussed by
Lounela – which on the face of it conflict with the values of traditional sociality. On
further examination, these actually turned out to resonate quite closely with earlier
emphases on autonomy and the family. In a similar vein, the new ‘business rituals’ prac-
ticed in Luangan appeared at first glance to reflect ‘shifting and conflicting value orien-
tations’, and yet upon closer scrutiny, suggests Herrmans, they served ‘to maintain
precisely some of those values that they are taken to contradict’, such as an extended
field of relationality. Consider now, finally, the longstanding conflict between José and
Wigan, the two Ifugao villagers described by Remme: at the heart of their disagreement
was the fact that each held to a different interpretation of the value of tradition. Wigan
saw his attempt to purchase land as legitimately traditional, while José did not; and thus
he saw autonomy and tradition as eminently reconcilable. What all this suggests, I think,
in the first instance, is that we cannot simply assume that ostensibly conflicting values do
really conflict, and are ultimately incommensurable, in the absence of evidence that
people consistently experience them as such – which is to say, that a wrong has been
done when they choose one over the other. Our hermeneutical task, in such cases,
should be to offer an interpretation of those values that strives at consistency or compat-
ibility. Such a conclusion points further at the difficulty, if not impossibility, of depicting
any given society as straightforwardly monist or pluralist, simply because of how values
are always open to if not demanding (re-)interpretation, by our interlocutors themselves
as much as by ourselves as analysts. In the final analysis, any claim that values exist in
tension must contend with the clearly observable tendency that people have to minimise
internal discrepancies and conflicts: their inclination, as it were, to unify value.
Conclusion
The importance, but also ambivalence, of sociality comes through strongly in this
volume. People clearly pursue and value their relationships with others, perhaps above
all else. And yet the importance placed on relating with others seems often to stand in
a kind of tension with the value of autonomy, of being one’s own person. What is
more, the relations with others that are valued are not always purely connective or inte-
grative; many relations must be carefully monitored for excessive closeness. Focusing on
values reveals very clearly this essential aspect of sociality, as demanding attention to the
processes through which separation and connection are managed and negotiated. It also
helps to reveal how periodic disagreement and disengagement from others may be for-
mative, moulding people into recognisable (and valued) kinds of subjects.
Are values really important in motivating people to act? The papers collected here
suggest only a very tentative yes. The role of values really becomes clear only in those
cases where people are induced, for one reason or another, to consider how particular
acts can be justified in the face of critique. This highlights a potential problem with
any approach, including Weber’s, which construes values as prior to action or as motiv-
ating it from without, rather than as coming into being through action or as a post-hoc
rationalisation of it. Such a view, we might suggest, corresponds to a particular view of
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FORUM 9
sociality as essentially a matter of cooperation: a process that establishes beneficial forms
of coordination between fully formed individuals, who for reasons of perceived mutual
benefit decide to enter into relationship. What is lacking here is the generative dimension
of sociality, properly construed: the way it shapes persons, just as social action shapes
values and brings them into being, above all through processes of justification and cri-
tique – or what Sillander (2021) in the Introduction refers to as authorisation. This
further brings us to the observation that values, like sociality, have a strong ideological
character: once they enter into discourse, or become objects of reflection and delibera-
tion, they increasingly serve to conceal and legitimise what is really going on, and who
benefits. At the very least, we should ask why certain values and forms of sociality
become dominant in particular times and places. As Graeber (2013, 228) writes, after all,
this is what politics is always ultimately about: not just to accumulate value, but to define
what value is, and how different values… dominate, encompass, or otherwise relate to
one another; and thus at the same time, between those imaginary arenas in which they
are realized.
Simul et singulis, ‘Be together while remaining yourself’, runs the motto of the presti-
gious Comédie Française theatre troupe whose evanescent sociality, according to Heintz
(2018), is similarly characterised by unevenly shared commitments to values that can
appear to pull people in opposing directions. This might just be a wonderfully apt
motto for many of the peoples described in this volume, whatever their specific differ-
ences in terms of what they hold dear and the kinds of life they aspire to. It neatly encap-
sulates the essence of a particular form of sociality that is especially highly valued in
diverse settings throughout the world, constituted through a kind of tension or balancing
act between two independent values which nevertheless might, if we look closely – which
is to say, dedicate ourselves to the task of interpretation – reinforce one another after all.
Note
1. Affective action (undertaken as a means of satisfying the immediate demands of an
emotional state such as passion or anger) and traditional action (arising more from
ingrained habit or routine than from any conscious deliberation) were both seen as less
reflective and rational (see Weber 1978, 24–26).
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